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Background
• Stealthy malware: spyware, adware, 
bots, ….
• Subtle command/control system
• Organized malicious activities
• Spamming, hosting phishing sites, DDoS attacks
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Traffic Aggregation for 
Malware Detection (TAMD)
• Observe flow records at network border
• Assumptions:
• More than one infected host in the 
network
• Malware communication patterns different 
from benign hosts
• Traffic aggregates: network traffic sharing 
common characteristics
• Question: what characteristics can identify 
malware? 3
Aggregate Characteristics
• Common destination
• Spyware “phone-home”, botnet 
controller, bot update server, DDoS 
attack victim
• Similar Payload
• Bot commands
• Similar platform
• Platform-dependent infections
• Challenge: identify malware traffic while 
limiting the number of false alarms4
Destination Aggregates
• Internal hosts contacting the same “busier-
than-usual” external subnets
• Use past traffic as baseline
• Represent internal hosts as vectors
• Dimensions (i.e., D1, D2, ...) correspond to 
external subnets
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Destination Aggregates
(cont’d)
• Dimension Reduction
• Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
• Re-interpret data with new axes that 
captures most of the data variance
• Clustering
• Iteratively select furthest vector to be new 
hub
• Clusters contain hosts contacting the same 
“busier-than-usual” subnets
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Assign random point as initial 
hub.
Assign furthest point as new hub. Re-
cluster.
Iterate.
Stop when all points are closer to their 
hub than half of the average hub-hub 
distance.
Destination Aggregates
(cont’d)
Payload Aggregates
• Flows with “similar” payload prefix
• Edit distance as similarity metric
• Number of character insertions, 
deletions, substitutions, to turn one 
string into the other
• Captures syntactic similarities
• “.bot.execute 1 notepad.exe”
“.bot.execute 0 cmd.exe”
“abcdeeeeeenoopttuxx1.. . ”
• However, computationally expensive
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Payload Aggregates (cont’d)
• Locality Sensitive Hashing [Datar-Immorlica-Indyk-Mirrokni’04]
• Near-neighbor search: close points hash to 
same buckets
• Edit Sensitive Parsing [Cormode-Muthukrishnan’02]
• Embed edit distance into L1 distance
• As a result...
• Only compute edit distance for strings whose 
vectors hash to same buckets
• Time roughly proportional to size of data set
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Platform Aggregates
• Traffic from hosts of similar platform
• TTL (Time-to-Live) field
• Communication with characteristic 
sites
• e.g., Microsoft time server
10
Multi-Level Aggregation
• Aggregation Functions:
• ByDestination
• ByPayload
• ByPlatform 
• In combination, refine resulting 
aggregates
• Traffic sharing multiple relevant 
characteristics
• Example: platform-dependent infections 
that contact common sites 
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Aggregation Example
Multiple infected hosts 
contacting sites 
uncommon to benign 
hosts.
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ByDestination
Aggregation Example (cont’d)
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ByDestination
Malware communication 
similar among infected 
hosts.
ByPayload
Multiple infected hosts 
contacting sites 
uncommon to benign 
hosts.
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ByDestination
Platform-dependent 
infection.
ByPayload
ByPlatform
Malware communication 
similar among infected 
hosts.
Aggregation Example (cont’d)
Multiple infected hosts 
contacting sites 
uncommon to benign 
hosts.
Evaluation Data
• Network traces from Carnegie Mellon 
University network border
• Two /16 subnets, over 33,000 hosts
• Argus flow records:
• Captures ~5000 flows/sec
• 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. daily
• Experiments use TCP and UDP traffic only
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Evaluation Data (cont’d)
• Network traces from malware in virtual 
machines
• Bagle, IRCbot, Mybot, SDbot
• Infect 3~8 Windows XP virtual hosts with 
each malware binary
• One hour of traffic from each malware
• Network traces from botnets in honeynets
• Spybot : Four bots, 32-minute trace
• HTTP-bot : Four bots, three-hour trace
• Large botnet : > 340 bots, seven-minute 
trace 16
Evaluation
• For every hour of campus traffic, 
• For every malware,
• Assign malware traffic to randomly selected 
internal hosts of same platform
• Comprise 0.0097% of all internal hosts
• Input to aggregation functions
• Repeat over every hour during three 
weeks in November/December 2007
17
ByDestinatio
n
ByPayloa
d
ByPlatfor
m
Results
18
•On average, identified 
2.23 aggregates
•The single aggregate of 
infected hosts is always 
identified
2.23
Performance Statistics
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Function Run Time Total Run Time
[ByPlatform]
Alternative Botnet 
Architectures
• Peer-to-peer (P2P):
• Hard-coded peer list
• Bots report back to designated site 
• Use P2P to transfer URLs for downloading 
binaries 
• Hybrid:  Smaller centralized botnets peer in 
P2P 
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Limitations and Ongoing 
Work• Temporal locality in malware communication
• But sparse communication restricts botnet size and 
responsiveness
• Diversity in hosts’ platforms
• Good results with only ByDestination and ByPayload
• P2P with peer discovery through random 
probing 
• ByPayload or ByPlatform
• Encrypted payload
• Extend “similar” to include encrypted traffic
• Isolated bots 21
Conclusion
• Traffic Aggregation for Malware Detection 
(TAMD): Identifies traffic sharing common 
network characteristics
• Common destination
• Similar payload
• Common platform
• Detects stealthy platform-dependent malware 
contacting common sites
• Successful even when number of simulated 
infected hosts comprise 0.0097% of internal 
hosts  
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